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John Austin or Jane Austen?
The Province of Jurisprudence Determined
in Pride and Prejudice
William MacNeil
It used to be a truth universally acknowledged that the novels of
Jane Austen were narratives in want ofcontext.} The Napoleonic
Wars, industrialisation and the French Revolution: in fact, all
the great and heroic events ofthe period are conspicuous by their
absence in the 'little bit (two Inches wide) of ivory' upon which
dear Jane worked with 'so Fine a brush'.2 Post-colonial critics,
however, have sensitised readers to the traces of context on the
margins ofAusten's oeuvre, and how, despite this marginality-
or perhaps, as the Derrideans would say, because orit - they
perform an absolutely central function in terms of the novels's
plotting, characte.rology and thematics. For example, the imperial
context ofMansfield Park is the principal focus of Edward Said's
celebrated reading ofthat text in Culture andImperialism (1994:
95-116). There, Said's reading turns on an often overlooked
narrative detail of the novel: the significance of Sir Thomas
Bertrams's Jamaican estate which, while a literal absence in the
text (no scene is'aftually set there, though some characters - Sir
Thomas notably - go missing occasionally from the storyline
because of visits there), is, nonetheless, a pervasive imaginative
presence (as the site and source of the Bertram family fortune).
My argument today addresses a different text, Pride andPrejudice,
but shadows that ofSaid and repeats many of his critical moves;
however, the contextual argument which I p'ropose to advance is
not about the Empire but what might be called, with a nod to
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire. For it is my argument here that
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Pride and Prejudice's principal concerns are legal, and, more
precisely jurisprudential, thereby linking Jane Austen, by more
than justhomonym~with the pioneering jurisprudential thinker
of her day, her near contemporary, the utilitarian and positivist
jurist, John Austin, the first professor ofEnglish Law at University
College London and the author of the then leading standard
text on common law jurisprudence, The Province ofJurisprudence
Determined. Indeed, it will be my central thesis that]aneAusten's
Pride andPrejudice is John Austin's The Province ofJurisprudence
Determined, and vice versa.
This claim may seem strange not just bec~use Pride and
Prejudice predates The Province ofJurisprudence Determined by
some years, but also because the law seems to figure so little in
the novel. A sceptical reader might well exclaim, (Where is the
law in Pride andPrejudice?' Only one character, and a minor one
at that - Mrs Bennet's brother-in-law, Mr Philips - is a lawyer.
And he is not even a 'good' lawyer in the sense of belonging to
the socially desirable branch of the profession: namely, the bar.
Rather he is a mere pettifogger, an 'attorney' whose portrait would
hang, so Caroline Bingley comments ironically, so well next to
Darcy's ancestor,. the eminent judge (I, X, 36). This absence of
law becomes even more ma~~ed.whet:1 mC?ving, however, from
the legal profession to the legal process itself. Oddly, no one seems
to (go to law' in Jane Austen's novel, though it is set, in large part)
among that class ofsociety most likely to litigate: the propertied
classes ofland and commerce. Sales ofgoods as much as leases of
land seem to be unproblematic in this world, a distortion, if
there ever was one, of the historical recor~. Even when a public
wrqng is committed, let alone a private dispute, no one seems to
turn to the legal authorities. For example, the law is never invoked
2
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- no magistrate notified, no justice of the peace alerted - when
the wicked Wickham (who, incidentally and very tellingl)', once
professed his intention ofstudying law, (II, XII, 131» makes off,
for a second time, with another underage female: this time Lydia
Bennet rather than Georgiana Darcy as his willing victim, against
whom he commits, in all likelihood, what we would call today a
statutory rape. But despite this juridical absence, both in terms
ofemplotment and characterology, the law is, like the Empire in
Mansfield Park, an all pervasive thematic presence in Pride and
Prejudice, informing much of its character motivation and
constituting the key plot mechanism driving its narrative action.
The law I speak of is the law ofinheritance: specifically, the legal
device of the 'entail' which obtains over Longbourn, the modest
country seat of the Bennet family. An entail settles property on,
and fixes a prescribed line ofsuccession which cannot be altered
by any ofthose individuals in whom the entailed property vests.3
The entail on Longbonrn is in the male line (and is settled upon
Mr Bennet's nearest male next-of-kin, his cousin, Mr Collins),
thereby disinheriting, and, ultimately dispossessing the Bennet
sisters upon the death of their father (much adverted to by Mrs
Bennet, and a source ofmuch of the novel's 'gallows's humour').
This instantiation ofwhat Lacan would call the 'law ofthe
Father's Name' activates, as no other device does, the plot of the
novel, shifting its setting from the rather static country house
comedy of manners - which the opening chapters, with their
focus on the badinage ofMr and Mrs Bennet, would suggest-
to a more dynamic line of action which moves, briskly, from
Longbourn to Meryton, and then onto Netherfield, Hunsford,
Rosings, Gracechurch St and Pemberley. This shift is more than
just scenic; it is thematic, particularly in the initial displacement
3
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from Longbourn to Meryton. Though the physical distance
between the two is slight, the psychic distance is great, as Meryton
seems to be outside the law as much as Longbourn is clearly within
it. For all is fixity at Longbourn - its past is a matter ofrecord; its
future predetermined: both temporalities secured by virtue of
the legal device ofthe entail- while nothing is fixed in Meryton.
Its condition, instead, is one offlux, functioning as a kind ofno
man's land, belonging to no one in particular but through which
everyone in general passes: for example, those disrupted by war,
like Col Foster's regiment ofCapt Carter, Denny and Wickham;
or those orphaned inheritors of property like Miss King,
Wickham's obscure object ofdesire; or those who belong nowhere
and everywhere like the rootless 'new rich', the Bingleys, whose
leased manorhouse, Netherfield, could act as a metaphor for all
ofMeryton and its environs. For everything is 'To Let' in Meryton,
not just Netherfield but, so it seems from Mrs Bennet, 'Hay..
Park ... the great house at Stoke .. , Ashworth and Purvis Lodge'
(III, VIII, 198). And everyone is price-tagged: 10,000 outright
for Miss King (II, I~99); 5,000 pa for Bingley (I, I, 4); much
less for the regimentals, so much so that even Mrs Gardiner warns
Elizabeth against an 'imprudent' (II, III, 95) match with the
penniless Wickham. ~learly, exchange values prevail here, and,
because everyone and everychinKhas _~ts price and is up for sale,
Meryton is a feverish scene ofspeculation, as all and sundry vie
to renegotiate their futures (like Mr Collins and his three offers
,of marriage) as much as rewrite their pasts (like Mr Wickham
and his reinvention ofhimselfas victim rather than villain of the
piece).
All of which is co say thac, perhaps, Meryton is not so
much outside the Law as previously suggested. Indeed, the
4
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constant round ofoffer, counter-offer, rejection and acceptance
which constitutes .much ofMeryton's social tie suggests a regime
which, while very different from that ofLongbourn's entailment
and its status certainties, is, nonetheless, a legal regime: namely
that of contract. Of course, the contract most often negotiated
in Meryton is the marriage contract, itself a bargain for a new
sort ofstatus. But note the .absence ofgreat arranged alliances of
the classic status society. Only one such example is proferr€d in
the novel: that ofMiss Ann de Bourgh to Darcy, an engagement
which even Lady Catherine describes as ofa 'peculiar kind' (III,
XI~ 228) and which never comes to fruition. Thus, even
aristocratic marriage in the novel has come under the sway of
contract's exchange values. For those actually in Meryton and
subject directly to its regime of contract, like the dispossessed
Bennet sisters, the change is even more dramatic; they enact what
the eminent nineteenth-century legal anthropologist and
comparativist Sir Henry Maine said was the classic move of
'modernity', a move which is also jurisprudential: the movement
from status to contract (Maine 1963: 165).
The citation of this well-worn formula - the move from
status to contract - should-not be read, however, as some
Whiggish celebration of the shift from Longbourn (the society
ofstatus) to Meryton (the society ofcontract)was allegorising the
movement from therealm ofnecessity to that offreedom. Make
no mistake about it, Meryton is no realm of freedom released
from the constraints of necessity. Options, choices, even
autonomy itselfare constrained there by the material conditions
within which each ofits inhabitants is situated, and which skew,
in turn, the putatively level playing field offreedom ofcontract,
and, indeed, the entire network ofcapitalist relations ofwhich it
5
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is a symbol. Consider just one example: Jane Bennet's explanation
to the appalled Elizabeth why her dose· friend and confidante,
)
Charlotte Lucas, would entertain, let alone accept, a man ofMr
Collins's severe limitations. 'Remember that she is one ofa large
family; that as to fortune, it is a most eligible match'(II, I, 88).
Examples such as these - pointing to material conditions which
constrain and distort the freedom of contract and Capital -
proliferate throughout the novel, so much so that the
representation which emerges of Meryton, and its regime of
contract, is anything but an 'Eden of the innate rights of man',
Or, ifit is a paradisal realm ofthe Rousseauesque social contract,
then it is only so in the highly ironic way Marx - the author of
the above cited sobriquet - intended it in Capital: that is, as a
place where 'alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and
Bentham', so that freedom produces wage slavery, equality leads
to substantive inequit)r, property reinforces rather than challenges
bourgeois privilege, and Bentham masks and mitigates the master-
slave relationship between, as he puts it in Capital, 'the capitalist;
(and) the possessor oflabour-power (who) follows as his labourer.
The one with an air ofimportance, smirking, intent on business;
the other, timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his
own hide to market and has nothing to expect but - a hiding'
(Marx 1954: 416).
The reference to Bentham here is very apropos Pride and
Prejudice, particularly the scenes set in Meryton. For if there is
any jurist who underwrites Meryton's regime of contract it is
that apostle of utility, Jeremy Bentham, whose Introduftion to
the Principles ofMorals and Legislation supplies not just the
community's doctrinal core but its very vocabulary. Consider,
for example, the language of the two women most anxious to
6
John Austin orJane Austen?
maximise their pleasure and minimise their pain in making a
good match: Carolin~ Bingley and Charlotte Lucas. In one of
her poison pen letters toJane, Caroline Bingley uses a very teUing
phrase to describe the hoped""for match between her brother,
Charles, and Georgiana Darcy. This alliance of 'brass and class'
is described as producing 'the happjness of so many' (I, XXI,
79), a phrasing which evokes the first principle of utility itself:
the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number'.-4 Charlotte Lucas
goes even further in her language, so much so that I wonder if
she is, indeed, the author of the Introduction to the Principles of
Morals andLegislation, because from the first scenes in which she
is introduced - the visit to Lucas Lodge, following the assembly
(I, V), and then at the reception at the Lodge - she speaks not
only of 'happiness' but 'felicity' (I, VI, 16), that other great
Benthamitebuzzword with all of its associations of the 'calculus
of felicity'.5 And calculate she does: urging Jane to display rather
than conceal her affection for ningley, after weighing all the
advantages and disadvantages ofone or the other mode ofconduct
(I, VI, 15); accepting Mr Collins's offer of marriage out of the
'pure and disinterested desire ofan establishment' (I, XXII, 82);
and even pairing off Elizabeth, when staying at Hunsford, with
Darcy rather than Col Fitzwilliam because ofthe former's access
to Anglican Church patronage (II, IX, 118). Charlotte is the
Benthamite utilitarian par excellence though pushed to its most
vulgar Posnerian extreme, anticipating those contemporary
Gradgrinds, the law-and-economics movement: reason is her
faculty (anticipating rational choice theory), and happiness, in
its most material sense - ofwealth maximisation - is her goal: 'I
am not romantic', she says to Elizabeth, in a statement of the
obvious if there ever was one, 'I ask only a comfortable home;
and considering Mr Collins's character, connections and situation
7
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in life, I am convinced that my chance of happiness is as fair as
most people can boast ...' (I, XXII, 84) ..
The problem with this Benthamite logic, ofcourse, is that
it backfires spectacularly, nowhere more so than when it gives
you what you want, proving the truth ofthe old adage that· it's
often a curse to get what you wished for. For is there a more
chilling, nay ghoulish portrayal in nineteenth-century fiction of
the lowest circle of matrimonial hell - outside the Dorothea
Brooke - Mr Causabon marriage in Middlemarch - than the
picture of the Collinses at Hunsford living together, though in
splendid isolation - he in his book room, she in her back parlour
(II, VII) - keeping social (and, doubtless, other forms of)
intercourse to a minimum? These bleak 'scenes from a marriage'
call into question the calculus of felicity, and the happiness it
produces, which seems too little by far here. But I would like to
-argue that utility; as a force of desire (after all, what is felicity?
what is happiness?), as much as reason (of calculus, of social
planning), is marked by a doubleness which releases not only
too little but also too much jouissance into the regime ofcontract
as well as Capital,an excess ofpleasure which overreaches itself,
enacting utility's law ofdesire - the desire for more - at the very
moment at which it undermines its desire for law - and its
moderation ofthe desire for more. Lydia Bennet's amorous career
is a graphic illustration of the utility principle run amok:
'untamed, unabashed, wild) noisy, and fearless' (III, IX, 201). In
her, the calculus offelicity becomes the 'thoughtless' (III, V, 186)
pursuit of pleasure of the crassest kind - 'extravagant in wants
and heedless of the future' (III, XIX, 248), driving her from the
seaside pavilions of Brighton to Londons demimondaine and
then finally to a shabby genteel existence, 'unsettled in the
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extreme' (III, XIX, 249) on the fringe of good society in the
North. It is only, however, with the figure of Mrs Bennet that
utility reac4es its real apogee ofself-defeating excess, so much so
that it produces a kind of paralysis. Hers is probably one of the
most interesting pathological characters drawn in literature,
condensing~as she does a variety ofsymptoms figured individually
in the other utilitarian characters: Lydia's licentiousness (in Mrs
Bennet's own self-confessed fixation with officers in youth, 'I
confessed ... I cried for two days together- when Colonel Millar's
regiment went away' (II, XVIII, 148», Charlotte's opportunism
CA single man oflarge fortune; four or five thousand a year' (I, I,
1) is, after all, Mrs Bennet's beau ideal as much as Charlotte's)
and Caroline's social climbing (Mrs Bennet is, as well, a woman
of the middle classes - though the Meryton petit bourgeois rather
than the London haut bourgeois of the Bingleys - pressing her
way, and her family's, into the gentry and nobility). These
symptoms, once condensed, are then converted, rearticulated and
literally written on the 'nervous' body of Mrs Bennet, a
reinscription which supplies as vivid a metaphor as there ever
was for the hysterical excess of Capital, contract and its law of
desire, utility: 'I ... have', says Mrs Bennet, 'such tremblings, such
flutterings allover me, such spasms in my side, and pains in my
head, and such beatings in my heart' (III, V, 184).
It is precisely to escape this version ofwhat might be called
the 'monstrous materna1'6 - and the hysterical, nay psychotic
logic ofMeryton's Capital, contract and utility which it figures -
that triggers Elizabeth's departure for Hunsford to stay at the
invitation ofCharlotte Lucas, now Mrs Collins. This second scene
shift in the novel is, however, not so much a departure for
Elizabeth as it is a return; for, in journeying to the Collinses'
9
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vicarage, Elizabeth arrives back, at least thematically, in the same
world of statu·s· with which the novel opened at Longbourn.
Indeed, this world is much more status-conscious than
Longhourn, being figured in the far grander, even ostentatious
Rosings Park, the stately home and seat of the 'respectable,
ancient, honourable though untitled' (III, XI\!' 228) de Bourgh
family, furnished with, among other things, Mr Collins' objet
petit a, the chimneypiece in one of the drawing rooms alone,
costing 'eight hundred pounds' (1, XVI,S1). Certainly; the regime
of status is intensified here to a degree "that would satisfy any
Continental court ofthe ancien regime, its letter ofthe law being
followed strictly: 'Do not make yourselfuneasy, my dear cousin,
about your apparel' says Mr Collins to Elizabeth on the eve of
her first visit to Rosings, 'Lady Catherine is far from requiring
that degree ofelegance ofdress in us, which becomes herself and
her daughter.... She likes to have the distinction ofrank preserved'
(II, VI, 105). For Lady Catherine is the very spirit of the old,
aristocratic order ofthe eighteenth-century with its compulsions
about protocol, its obsessions over precedence - 'I am excessively
attentive to all those things' (II, XIV: 137), she says - pathologies,
incidentally, in marked contrast to the hysteria ofMeryton.
In fact, Lady Catherine, and the world she represents, is
quite the reverse of Meryton and its values. Unlike Meryton's
faux gentry - take the example of the Lucases, recently in trade
but now reinventing themselves as knighted country squires (I,
V) - Lady Catherine is the 'real thing' (even, one might say, tpe
horrifying das Ding of Kant and Lacan).7 No respectably born
chatelaine her, Lady Catherine bears, instead, the coronet,
quarterings and honorific befitting an earl's daughter, and so
ranks, by birth, even above the de Bourghs and the Dareys;
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indeed, in the social world of the novel, she is its very pinnacle.
And it is precisely this positioning at the very top ofthe hierarchy
and, indeed, as the spokeswoman for the previously unassailable,
but now threatened and soon to be displaced aristocratic hegemon
- this is, after all, a revolutionary eta - that makes her the
implacable class enemy of an (upstart ... of a young woman
without famil)', connections, or fortune' (III, XI\!, 229), the
irredeemably middle-class Elizabeth Bennet. For Lady Catherine
is Elizabeth's principal nemesis, and, more than any other
character in Pride and Prejudice, she is the 'villain of the piece'
exceeding George Wickham's selfishness, Caroline Bingley's
spitefulness and Mrs Bennet's meanness ofspirit, though, unlike
any of these characters fortune and rank have given Lady
Catherine the power to implement her fantasies ofcontrol. And
with what, to quote Mr Collins, 'affability' and 'condescension'
(I, XI~ 45) - in short, 'enjoyment' in its darkest Lacanian-
Zizekian8 sense - she carries out that control: 'improving' the
vicarage and Charlotte's housewifery (II,VI, 107); trading in the
acceptable wage slavery of the period - the hiring and firing of
governesses - by entrusting that 'treasure', Miss Pope- to Lady
Metcalf (II, VI, 108); and scheming, since their birth, for Darcy
and Anne's marriage: 'From their infancy, they have- been intended
for each other. It was the favourite wish ofhis mother; as well as
her's. While in their cradles, we planned the union' (III, XI~
228).
My depiction ofLady Catherine as the 'villain ofthe piece',
however, is not without its problems, particularly when her
character is read through feminisflenses. For what, indeed, is so
villainous about a woman being 'authoritative'? 'formidable'? even
'self-important'? (II,VI, 106) - all adjectives used to describe her.
11
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Aren't these the very traits of her nephew, Dargr, the putative
hero ofthe novel? Does this suggest, as all patriarchies have tried
to, that what is a virtue in a man - strength - is a weakness in a
woman: an unsexing ofher; so that Lady Catherine's strength of
character is an affront and, indeed, a challenge to patriarchal
ideology? This rehabilitation of Lady Catherine as something
like "a feminist icon - carried out in the critical literature of, for
example, Johanna Smith (1992: 70)9 - is supported, in large part,
by the nature of the status claims which Lady Catherine makes
in her critique of the law, a critique which has some affinities
with the feminism ofher day and today. Like both these feminists,
Lady Catherine objects to a law which excludes women, the entail
obtaining over Longbourn: 'I see no occasion for entailing estates
from the female line - It was not thought necessary in Sir Lewis
de Bourgh's family' (II, VI, 108). Her argument for inclusiveness,
however, differs from the liberal critique ofher day or the critical
legal feminist position of today; for Lady Catherine is no Mary
Wollstonecraft declaring the 'rights of woman' (Wollstonecraft
1988), even less a Mary Jo Prug, proclaiming the 'politics of
difference' .10 Certai~ly) it is Elizabeth's claims to at least
conversational equality (she answers back on the matter of her
sisters all being 'out' (II, VI, 109)) and difference (she refuses, at
first~ to tell her age (II, VI, 109)) which antagonises Lady
Catherine. So instead of 'equality' feminism or 'difference'
feminism, Lady Catherine's position might best be described as
'essentialist' ,11 what being more essential than birth itself:
particularly the bond between mother and child. Hence, her
advocacy of the Natural Law of the Mother's Body - the 'noble
line' (III, XI~ 228) of the house ofFitZWIlliam, her birth family
- and her emphasis on the maternal, line from which both Ann
de Bourgh and Fitzwilliam Darcy descend, as the deciding point
12
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in sealing their union. They both enjoy what the Inquisition
called the limpieza de sangre, the 'purity ofblood' Oohnson 1976:
307), so conspicuously absent in the Bennet, but especially
Gardiner strain. Indeed, in rebuke to Elizabeth's claim of the
linguistic Law ~fthe Father's Name ('I am a gentleman's daughter'
III, XIV, 229), she says point-blank: 'But who was your mother?
Who were you uncles and aunts? Do not imagine me ignorant of
their condition?' (III, XIV: 229). So much for universal sisterhood,
the suggestion being here, in this final showdown at Longbourn,
that matriarchy can be just as divisive, just as oppressive, just as
hamfisted as patriarchy at its most primitive.
There is something truly atavistic in Lady Catherine's
endogamous sanction here, an anthropological overtone which
is heightened by her cry that an alliance with a family which
includes the Wickhams would 'pollute the shades of Pemberley'
(III, XIV, 229), a phrasing evocative of Totem and Taboo. 12 For
Lady Catherine is a totemic figure - and, for Mr Collins, even
more, a fetish - who bears comparison with the Freudian 'primal
father'. Like the primal father, Lady Catherine speaks a sexual
prohibition - a 'No. In thunder', refusing the exogomous marriage
of Darcy to Elizabeth in favour of the endogomous marriage
with Ann: 'Tell me once for all, are you engaged to him?', she
demands~ securing, in turn, Elizabeth's admission, 'I am not' (III,
XIV: 229). And, equally, like the primal father, her prohibition,
ultimately; is transgressed: it is Elizabeth's flat refusal ('I will make
no promise of the kind', III, XIV: 229) not 'to enter into such an
engagement' (III, XI~ 229) which teaches Darcy to 'hope' (III,
XVI, 245) that a second proposal might not go amiss. But unlike
the 'primal fat~er' who is, after all, himselfsacrificed by the tribe
in Totem and Taboo, the 'primal mother' survives here, as the
13
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epilogue dearly teUs us, still insisting, one imagines, that all and
sundry sacrifice themselves - their very subjectivities - to her, a
reading of Lady Catherine's function which is more Lacanian
than Freudian. For is there a grimmer representation of the
Lacanian 'mirror phase' (Lacan: 1977: 1-7), and its specular
sacrifice ofsubjectivity in its looking-glass lures, than in the sdf-
abnegation which Mr Collins undergoes in his 'misrecognition'
of Lady Catherine as his ego-ideal? Collins is lucky, though, in
that he still lives to flatter her Ladyship with those rehearsed
'elegant compliments' (I,~ 46) which gave Mr Bennet so much
amusement, a damning comment on not only the sycophancy
of his character but the erastian cringe ofAnglicanism. At least,
however, he survives, a fate which is not so dearly marked out
for Ann de Bourgh who is repeatedly referred to as 'thin and
small' (II, VI, 104), 'pale and sickly' (II, VI, 104) and 'sickly and
cross' (II, VI, 104), the suggestion being that she may not live to
enjoy her splendid inheritance. What, or more to the point, who
is killing Miss. de Bourgh? I would like to suggest that it is not
just aristocratic in-breeding but Lady Catherine's 'ill breeding'
(II, VIII, 113) which is killing Ann, draining her of life and,
even, possibly, of blood. For Lady Catherine is of that species of
the 'monstrous maternal' which exceeds even that ofMrs Bennet's
calibre: she devours her young.
With Elizabeth's departure from Rosings the narrative, as
well as this argument, reaches a crossroads (literalised in the text
by the stay at the inn in BOQ]{ II, Chapter XVI where she is met
by Lydia and Kitty). This crossroads is also an impasse. For where
is Elizabeth to go? Having been 'foreclosed' from both
instantiations of the status society - the Symbolic Order of the
linguistic Law of the Father's Name (Longbourn), from which
14
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she is barred by virtue ofher sex; and the ImagInary Order of the
Natural Law of the Mother's Body (Rosings), from which she is
tabooed because ofthe impurity ofblood ofher kinship network
- she now has only the Real of the hystericised, even psychotic
economy of Meryton's regime of contract to which to return, a
temptation which she rightly resists. All ofwhich raises the issue
as to whether there is, somewhere else, an alternative space,
another country, as it were, subject to a different kind of law -
unfettered by status but more anchored than contract - in which
Elizabeth can assume a subjectivity and establish a social tie. I
would like to suggest that such a location presents itself while
Elizabeth is on her rural rambles with those centres of moral
authority, the Gardiners, during their Peak District holidays in
Derbyshire. The scene is a famous·one, so I quote at some length:
The park was very large, and contained a great variety ofground.
They entered it in one of its lowest points, and drove for some
time through a beautiful wood, stretching over a wide extent....
They gradually ascended for half a mile, and then found
themselves .at the top of a considerable eminence, where the
wood ceased, and the eye was instantly caught by ... a large,
handsome, stone building, standing well on rising ground, and
backed by-a ridge ofhigh woody hills - and, in front, a stream
ofsome natural importance was swelled into greater, but without
any artificial appearance. Its banks were neither formal, nor
falsely adorned. Elizabeth was delighted (III, I, 156).
This passage, describing Elizabeth's approach to, and arrival at
the ancestral seat of the Dareys and her future home, Pemberley,
is justly celebrated by narratologists like Michael Riffaterre (1990),
though not, as might be expected in a novel ofrealist conventions,
for its scenic· detail. In fact, quite the reverse, since the passage
15
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utilises, as Riffaterre argues very persuasively, a language of
descriptive markers which tell the reader virtually nothing in terms
of setting: empty adjectives like 'large', 'beautiful', 'wide' and
'handsome', creating absolutely no pictur~ for the reader. For
what is really being envisaged here, according to Riffaterre, is
not so much a picture ofa place as it is a 'portrait ofa lady', and,
particularly- to continue the Jamesian analogy- ofher individual
consciousness reacting to a place, registering her 'delight'; and,
in so doing, indicating a complete shift in point of view, a
reorientation of affect and a new love interest. Remember,
Elizabeth will confide later to Jane, however tongue-in-cheek this
confidence may seem, that she first fell in love with Mr Darcy
when she first saw his 'beautiful grounds at Pemberley' (III, XVII,
240), a comment which echoes and renders explicit her feeling
here that 'To be mistress of Pemberley would be something
indeed' (III, I, 156).
As cop:1pelling as I find this reading, I would like to suggest
another not so much as' an alternative but as complementary;
one which stresses the exteriority ofthe physical scene as much as
the interiority of Elizabeth's consciousness. For what does this
scene represent but a house, specifically a country house in the
grand style? Now the country house is a significant structural
device and potent symbol in nineteenth and twentieth-century
literature, evoking a range of associations, some national, some
cultural, some political, but almost always legal. The country
house is the house oflaw- whether natural, positivist or otherwise,
the overarching question about it being the legal one ofwho will
inherit, for example, Tipton? Gardencourt? Howard's End?
Brideshead?This question ofinheritance, however, can be as much
a burden as a benefit, even a curse, as amply demonstrated by
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the Gothicised, and sinister haunted houses of law found
throughout the period, both in English literature (eg. in Dickens's
Bleak House, the source of controversy in the case Jarndyce v
jarndyce) , and in American literature (eg. in Nathaniel
Hawthorne's House ofthe Seven Gables, the site ofseveral crimes
- murder principally - perpetrated by, or against the Pyncheon
family of Salem). Nothing could be further from the haunted
house oflaw, however, than the representation ofPemberley here;
indeed, the solidity of its foundations, the symmetry of its
architecture, the harmony that obtains between it structure and
natural setting, the timelessness of the style, all these details
suggest, in their very coherence, integrity and abstractedness the
ideal of the English common law as reimagined by not just the
utilitarian Bentham, hut his positivist disciple, John Austin.
]ohnAustin's The Province ofjurisprudence Determined, as
much as Bentham's much earlier Limits a/jurisprudence Defined,
reimagines the law along virtually architectural lines. Consider
Austin's description of the law when viewed from the vantage of
his jurisprudence, a perception of structural order, almost
Palladian in its proportions, which recalls - indeed, mimics -
Pemberley's elegant lines and Elizabeth's appreciation of them.
He writes:
[I]f ... approached ... with a well-grounded knowledge of the
general principles ofjurisprudence, and with the map ofa body
oflaw distinctly impressed upon his brain, he ['the student ... of
the English Law') might obtain a clear conception of it (as a
system or organic whole) with comparative ease and rapidity ...
he might perceive the various relations of its various part; the
dependence of its minuter rules on its general principles; and
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the subordination ofsuch of these principles as are less general
or extensive, to such of them as are more general, and run
through the whole of the structure (Austin 1954: 379).
This 'approach' to this house of law, however, differs from
Elizabeth's in that Pemherley is already a finished product, while
the common law still requires massive repair work. For Austin's
jurisprudential project was, like Bentham's, a blueprint ('the map
of a body of law') for legal reconstruction which, if 'impressed
on the brain', enabled one to see beyond the common law's
'arbitrary and unconnected rules' (Austin 1954: 379), to the
'organic' method underlying its surface madness. The first step
in releasing this organicism - the 'dependence' and 'subordination
of part to whole, particular to general - was to strip bare the
house of law of artifice, particularly those excrescences, 'legal
fictions'13 which 'Judge & CO'14 had contrived to cover the gaps,
cracks and fissures in the system's structural supports. Instead of
concealing these design flaws, Bentham and Austin wanted first
to expose them, bringing to light all the law's contradictions,
indeterminacies and aporias. But this exposure only served to set
the stage for their shared 'expository' agenda;15 for Austin, as
much as Bentham, wanted to order, classify and structure the
common law, resetting it on a 'posited) - man-made - foundation
with none of the philosophical 'nonsense ':lpon stilts' of the
Continental natural law tradition and its moral baggage ofeither
revolutionary natural rights or reactionary Roman Catholic
doctrine of the Aquinian sort. So the 'positivist' house of law
which Bentham and Austin construct, and which Austen figures
in Pemberley, is very different from, and indeed hostile to, the
law ofstatus, either in the form of the Law ofthe Father's Name
(the 'rights ofman', imaged in Longbourn)' or the Mother's Body
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(the divinely ordained hierarchy ofbirth, repre~ented in Rosings),
and all their respective gender and class sanctions (no women
need apply at Longbourn; no bourgeois at Rosings). Instead of
these sanctions, a Rule of Law doctrine would hold sway in the
positivist house oflaw, guaranteeing equal access to all. The same
access, in fact, that obtains at Pemberley, as evidenced by Mrs
Reynolds's obliging tour ofthe house (III, I), indicating that this
space is not only open to the nobility (Col Fitzwilliam, Lady
Catherine, Miss de Bourgh), the gentry (Darcy, Georgiana) and
their class allies, the haut bourgeois (the Bingleys and Hursts),
but the very middle class Gardiners of Cheapside and Elizabeth
herself.
Anchoring this site ofopen access and free movement, and
giving it a centr~ - in sharp contrast to the flux ofMeryton - is
Fitzwilliam Darcy himselfwho, as master ofPemberle}', functions
also as the utilitarian 'sovereign' ofthis house oflaw; a connection
which Elizabeth makes explicitwhen she ruminates, 'As a brother,
a landlord, a master, she considered how many people's happiness
were in his guardianship - How much pleasure or pain it was in
his power to bestow. How much good or evil must be done by
him' (III, I, 158). Speculation, however, about the nature of
Darcy's 'sovereignty' are almost instantly resolved by the good
reports of Mrs Reynolds: the 'best landlord and best master' to
his staff and tenants (III, I, 159); a 'good brother' to his sister,
giving her 'whatever is ~to give her pleasure' (III, I, '159); and a
man of the most benevolent 'good-nature' who has never had a
'cross word' for his old housekeeper since he was four years old
(III, I, 158). Now, given the source, this testimonial may sound
like one of those sentimentalisations of the feudal order which
abound in romance literature, usually ventriloquised by old
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retainers, nurses or mammies who love their masters, charges or
white folk more than themselves; and that Darcy is the benign
grandseigneur is preciselywhat his 'civility' (III, I, 165) and 'stately'
manners (III, I, 164) suggest, initially, to the Gardiners: the whim
ofa great man (III, 1, 164). I would argue, however, for Darcy in .
the role of the utilitarian sovereign in the best Benthamite mode
because he seems guided not so much by noblesse oblige but by
the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number' in his dealings
with people. Nowhere does this .seem more so than in his handling
of the Lydia-Wickham elopement for which he blames himself
and his pride for failing in his public 'duty to step forward, and
endeavour to remedy the evil' by making Wickham's
'worthlessness ... so well known, as to make it impossible for any
young woman of character, to .love or confide in him' (III, X,
205). By securing Wickham's marriage to Lydia at the price of
dearing his debts, settling monies upon Lydia, purchasing his
commission and even standing up as groomsman at the ceremony
- doubtless to his extreme mortification - Darcy performs, as
Elizabeth, says an 'unexampled kindness' (III) XVI, 234) for the
little community at Longbourn, an act which, indeed, secures
the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
Darcy himself: however, complicates this claim that he is
the utilitarian sovereign, at least of the reforming Benthamite
stripe when he retorts to Elizabeth: 'I thought only ofyou' (III,
XVI, 235). Far from being motivated by the principle ofutility-
audits calculations for the widest distribution ofhappiness - his
objective has been a personal one, focused and specific: Elizabeth
hersel£ Now I want to ask: why? Why does Mr Darcy, master of
Pemberley, whom even-Lady Catherine treats as primus interpares,
coax, cajole and bribe his nemesis Wickham into marriage, restore
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Mr Bingley to Jane, and even endure the none-tao-subtle jibes
of Mrs Bennet for a woman whose connections and 'condition
in life is so decidedly beneath ... [his] own' (II, XI, 125)? What is
the attraction? Of course, the obvious answer is love; as he says
at Hunsford, 'You must allow me to tell you how ardently I admire
and love you' (II, XI, 123). But why does Mr Darcy love Elizabeth?
What is there that is loveable about her when, in her own words,
her 'behaviour to ... [him] was at least always bordering on the
uncivil', never speaking without 'wishing to give ... [him] pain'
(III, XVIII, 244). A quick review oEher behaviour confirms that
all she has done to provoke his love is snipe (as at the Meryton,
Netherfield and Rosings where all is pointed innuendo), shout
(as at Hunsford where innuendo is dropped for direct insult at
his condescending proposal), or burst into tears (as at Pemberley
when she receives the news of Lydia's catastrophic elopement).
In what lies her attraction, aside from, as Elizabeth herselfplayfully
suggests at the dose of the novel, her 'impertinence' (III, XVIII,
244)? A romantic reading ofthe novel would have Darcy looking
through Elizabeth's 'impertinence' and straight into her soul
through those windows to which he pointedl}', and much to the
chagrin of Miss Bingley, refers as her 'fine eyes' (1, VII, 19). But
I would like to suggest that it is precisely this 'impertinence' -
this resistance to Darc}', be it ~ither passive (as at Meryton,
Netherfield, Rosings or Pemberley), or active (as at Hunsford)-
which is the source ofElizabeth's appeal, a choice example of the
law of desire: ofwanting what you cannot have.
I want, however, to link this psychic condition with earlier
claims to Darcy's sovereign status because it is precisely this 'desire
for the desire of the Other' which confirms his political and
juridical role, though conceived now more in Austinian rather
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than Benthamite terms. For John Austin departs from, as much
as disseminates, his old mentor's theories, largely dropping the
utilitarian frame of Bentham's philosophy, and its reformist
agenda (Morrison 1982: 2), in favour ofadefinition ofsovereignty
which focuses on power,16 a power which I think is at work in,
and underpins the Darcy-Elizabeth match. The source of this
power, according to Austin, is the sovereign who is nothing more
than the one whose 'commands'are 'obeyed';17 hence, the popular
sobriquet of the 'command theory of law' to describe his
jurisprudence (Freeman 1994: 213-14). And, certainly, if there
is an Austinian sovereignin PrideandPrejudice, whose commands
are, indeed, obeyed, it is Darcy. 'He is the kind ofman', says the
most querulous, least obliging character in the novel, Mr Bennet,
'to whom I should. never refuse anything should he condescend
to act' (III, XVII, 242). Almost everyone else in the world ofthe
novel evinces a similar habit ofobediance towards Darcy, either
sooner (like Bingle)', who needs his 'permission', as Elizabeth puts
it, to court Jane (III, XVIII, 239» or later (like Wickham who is,
eventually, induced to marry Lydia). All, of course, except one:
Elizabeth Bennet. Her refusal to obey Dargr, in fact, is one of
the constants of the novel: from her decline ofhis offer to dance
at Lucas Lodge ('Mr Darcy with grave propriety requested to be
allowed the honour of her hand; but in vain. Elizabeth was
determined) (1, VI, 18» to the spectacular refusal ofhis proposal
at Hunsford (where he is 'the last man in the world whom I
could ever be prevailed upon to marry' (II, XI, 126».
Why Elizabeth refuses Darcy is attributable to her defining
trait which Darcy says, at the end of the novel, attract~ him in
the first place: het'Hvdiriess of mind' (III, XVIII, 244) which
enables her to see through, and critique his 'arrogance), 'conceit'
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and 'selfish disdain for the feelings of others' (II, XII, 126).
Certainly, Elizabeth is the critical intelligence of the book, both
as a suspicious close reader of texts (think of how well she
construes the real import of Caroline Bingley's letters) as well as
of character itself, which she reads just as sceptically: the
superciliousness of the Bingley sisters ('proud and conceited' (I,
I\T, 11», the thoughtlessness ofMr Bingley (particularly his 'want
of attention to other people's feelings' (II, I 90», the silliness of
Collins ('Can he be a sensible man?', is her reaction, even before
she meets him, to his letter of introduction (1, XIV, 44», the
forwardness of her younger sisters ('Vain, ignorant, idle and
absolutely uncontrolled', with Lydia a 'determined flirt' and Kitty
sure to 'follow' Lydia's lead, (II, XVIII, 149», the glibness ofher
father (she had 'never been blind to the impropriety ofher father's
behaviour as a husband' (II, XIX, 152), the opportunism of
Charlotte (upon the announcement ofCharlotte's engagement,
she feels the 'pang of a friend disgracing herself and sunk in her
esteem' (I, XXII, 84», even the amiability oEher confidante and
allyJane ('you are a great deal too apt you know, to like people in
generar (1, I~J 1). This repeated emphasis on Elizabeth's capacity
to critique - in short, to censure - suggests a jurisprudential
analogue to parallel Darcy's sovereignty: that of the 'censorial'
jurist who is not merely content to say what the law is (the
'expository' project ofAustin) 18 but what it ought to be19 - that
is, a Benthamite reformer alert to the discrepancies, indeed, the
iniquities of the juridical but also political status quo. And it is
in embodying this reformist agenda of censorial critique which
accounts for why Elizabeth, Jor all her acuity, is duped by
Wickham: because Wickham tells her the story that she, as the
critical legal lawyer - the censorial jurist, wants to hear, that of
natural merit overlooked, even wronged by hereditary privilege,
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in Darcy's supposed refusal to bestow the beneficed living of
Kympton on him, a narrative even Jane suspects ('her mild and
steady candollr always pleaded for allowances, and urged the
possibility of mistakes' (II, I). In allowing Elizabeth to be so
'blind, partial, prejudiced and absurd' (II, XIII, 135) in favour
of Wickham at the expense of Darcy, Austen ironises critique
and shifts the philosophical, political but particularly
jurisprudential orientation ofthe novel away from Bentham, and
his advocacy of the 'censoriar agenda, and towards Austin, and
his focus on power, propped up by the 'expository' law. For John
Austin ~ as much, if not more than Jane Austen - is motivated
by a profoundly conservative vision of the law, and, indeed,
politics and society;20" critique has no place here, Of, if it does, it
must be brought to heel, co-opted, even silenced. 'Censorial
jurisprudence' must, and is, in turn, censored in the work ofJohn
Austin as well as Jane Austen.
This is why, I would like to suggest, Darcy marries Elizabeth
because, in so doing, the Austinian sovereign is co-opting his
greatest critic - the 'censorial' jurist - who) in her refusal to obey,
threaten~ the delicate equilibrium ofthe 'expository' order of the
positivist house of law. This co-opeation of critique by a
reconstituted status quo is, as Gramsci has taught us,21 the
standard ideological move of,modernity' because it produces the
appearance of a society based on 'consent' when, in fact, it is
predicated upon silence. And this is precisely what Darcy does
to Elizabeth in her marrying her: he silences her. So much so, in
fact, that from the moment he makes his second proposal at
Longbourn, she loses her voice. Consider her response to his
propos"al which we never actually hear spoken, but which is
rendered through the most tortured circumlocution: 'Elizabeth
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feeling all the more common awkwardness and anxiety of his
situation) now forced herself to speak; and) immediately) though
not very fluently; gave him to understand) that her sentiment
had undergone so material a change) sincerthe period he alluded)
as to make her receive with gratitude and pleasure) his present
assurances) (III) XVI, 235). We hear nothing directly here; and
nor do we ever really hear directly from Elizabeth again, much to
the concern of Jane ('My dear, dear Lizzy, I would - I do
congratulate you - but are you certaint (III, XVII, 240» and
the alarm of Mr Bennet eWhat are you doing? Are you out of
your senses to be accepting this man?' (III, XVII, 242». All, in
fact, we do hear is a kind of ventriloquism in which Elizabeth
celebrates her sovereign, arguing that he has 'no improper pride'
(III, XVII, 242). Gone) indeed, is critique. So Elizabeth's fate is
sealed: she will be mistress of Pemberly, metonymised in terms
ofits economy ofobjects, which her mother gloatingly itemises,
'how rich and great you will be! What pin-motley) what jewels,
what carriages you will have! ... a house in town! Ten thousand a
year!' (III, XVII, 243). These credits, however, are offset by the
tremendous debt to be paid - the sacrifice of the Elizabeth's very
self, her 'different voice' as Carol Gilligan (1982) might put it-
in order to reign as the silent chatelaine of the house of law.
I stress the word 'reign' in connection with Elizabeth's new
role, because it is Darcy who continues to 'rule' at PemberleYJ
even when - or rather, especially when - this rule is challenged
in a minor way bYe Elizabeth's flippancy which gives so much
'astonishment' to Georgiana (III, XIX, 249) but which,
interestingly, the reader never hears dialogised. Indeed, Darcy's
rule is secured by Elizabeth's reign; her occasional dissent attesting
to an overarching consent which, more than anything else, ensures
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the persistence of Pemberley and the social, political and legal
values for which it stands. For what is the last scene of the novel
but a rendering of Pemberley as the site of class reconciliation,
visited not only by that emblem of status, Lady Catherine (who
is, doubtless, there out of 'curiosity to see how... (Darcy's) wife
conducted herself' (III, XIX, 249) but also the Gardiners, of
whom, tellingly, the last line of the novel speaks. Why are the
Gardiners the last characters to he referred to in Pride and
Prejudice? On one level- the sentimental one - it is because, as
the reader is told, they were the 'means ofuniting' Elizabeth and
Darcy (II, XIX, 250). So they seem to be the great romantic
allies of Pemberley, but I would also like to suggest, on the basis
of a more material reading - that of class analysis, that the
Gardiners are also its greatest threat. For who are the Gardiners
but the urban, affluent, educated bourgeoisie, precisely the class
leading the calls for reform in England (for, indeed, the Reform
Bill of 1832), and revolution elsewhere? Clearly in any other
country Mr Gardiner would be a ]acobin, inciting the mob to
burn Pemberly (and Rosings, Netherfield and Longbourn) to
the ground, and guillotining its in~abitants - imagine the
'affability' and 'condescension' ofLady Catherine in the tumbrils,
or better yet hanging from the entrails ofMr Collins. I allude to
the sanguinary sentiment of the ]acobins - not content to rest
until the last aristocrat was hanging from a lamp-post by the last
priest's entrails - because it is against this political background
that Jane Austen is writing; she, after all, had a cousin married to
a French count who perished in the Terror.22 As well, it is this
political future to which, with just as much if not more
trepidation, John Austin looks forward in anticipating not just
the Reform Act but Chartism and the 'making ofEnglish working
class'. Hence, in light of these political threats, both past and
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future, it is absolutely critical that the middle-class Gardiners be
integrated into the house oflaw, now positivised as the Austinian
command ofthe sovereign' rather than the (divine right ofkings' .
And where better than at Pemberley, because it is here that the
Austinian (province ofjurisprudence' finds its determination: in
mediating a very English compromise through a law which, in
marrying· (pride' (Mr Darcy) to 'prejudice' (Elizabeth), preserves
the forms of status (the organicism of the old order, imaged in
the country house at harmony with nature), aU the while
embracing the emergent forms of contract (the interests of
commercial and industrial capital for which the Gardiners speak).
All ofwhich returns me to the question which entitles this
article: Who wrote Pride and Prejudice? - Jane Austen or John
Austin? This question of authorship is closely related to each
author's relation to authority, and the troubling issue ofAustin's
but, particularly, Austen's politics as either transgressive or
regressive, liberal or conservative.23 I would like to argue, byway
of conclusion" that they are both and neither liberal and/or
conservative, a doubling which mimics the classic move of legal
ideology of facilitating change at the very moment it conserves
tradition. For example, Austen's politics, as much as Austin's, are
liberal in that they both attack the world of status: he, in his
assault on natural law, and the uncoupling of the positive law
from morality; she, in her satires of the aristocracy (here in Lady
Catherine, but also in Sir Walter Elliot, Miss Elliot and the
Viscountess Dalrymple in Persuasion) and the Established Church
(here in Mr Collins hut also in Mr Elton in Emma). Both,
however, are conservative in the sense that the house of law each
constructs becomes a sort of positivist panoptical prisonhouse,
in which are consigned Austen's (censorial' heroines - Elizabeth
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at Pemberley, but also, Marianne Dashwood at Delaford, even
Emma at her old home, Hartfield - and over which an Austinian
sovereign commands: Mr Darcy, Col Brandon and Mr Knightle}'.
But I would like to suggest that Jane Austen goes ·one step further
than John Austin in that she actually supercedes both readings -
the liberal and the conservative - at the very moment she
authorises each, opening up a space for a third.reading: one which
might be called the critical.legal reading. For in rendering, at the
close of the novel, both Elizabeth and Darcy as so thoroughly in
situ at Pemberley, Austen points us to the critical legal insight
that, far from being empty - and, hence, belonging to everyone
because it belongs to no one, the house oflaw is inhabited. Who
inhabits this house of law?: that is the question which critical
legal studies will ask and answer, variously, and depending upon
its particular stripe, as the ruling class (CLS in its Marxist form),
the patriarch (CLS in its feminist form) and the coloniser (CLS
in its race theory form). Austen has been quick to anticipate
these answers, entwining these strands into the enraced,
engendered and classified body of Mr Darcy. In exposing this
white, male ruling class body behind, and indeed controlling the
letter ofthe law, Austen contests, as much as confirms the positive
law which Darcy represents, anticipating not only Austin's
positivism but its critique. So, in answer to the question, 'who
wrote Pride andPrejudice?') dearly Jane Austen; but, in so doing.,
Austen prolepticallywrites and then critiquesAustins The Province
ofJurisprudence Determined because in figuring jurisprudence as
a stately home, Jane Austen looks not just to its 'determination'
- that is, its boundaries - but beyond them, past its barriers to
the crowds (the critical legal mob?) massing at its gates waiting
to enter, ransack and put to the torch the positivist house oflaw.
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Letter to]. Edward Austen, 16 December 181.6, quoted in Jane
Austen, Pride and Prejudice (1993: 270).
See the entry for 'entail' in Walker (1980).
Bentham writes in a footnote: 'To this denomination has oflate
been added orsubstituted thegreatest happiness or greatestfelicity
principle: this for shortness, instead ofsayingthatprinciple which
states the greater happiness of all those whose interest is in
question, as being the right and proper, and only right and proper
and universally desirable, end of human action' (1996: IIa).
Indeed, the opening paragraph ofAn Introduction to the Principles
ofMorals and Legislation explicitly links utility with this term,
arguing that the purpose of this principle is 'to rear the fabric of
felicity by the hands of reason and of law (1996: 11). Such
'felicity', moreover, is subject to precise calculations as Bentham
clearly demonstrates in the fourth chapter, entitled 'Value of a
Lot ofPleasure or Pain, How to be Measured.... Sum up all the












pains on the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure
will give the good tendency of the act upon the whole, with
respect to the interests of that individual person; if on the side
of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole' (1996: 40).
I borrow, with some modification, Barbara Creed's phrase, the
"monstrous feminine" - a very rich metaphor for Kristevan
abjection (1993: 3).
See especially 'On the Moral Law' in Lacan (1992: 71-84).
Zizek (1991: 3, 7-11, 30-31, 231-4, 237-41 and 271).
Smith emphasises, quite rightl}', the ambiguities of Eliabeth's
'victory over lady Catherine' which, while 'in some sense a
feminist one, the episode also has antifeminist as well as
antiaristocracy elements'. Lady Catherine is, after all a 'titled
woman' and a spokesperson for 'matrilineal desire'.
Frug (1992), see especially chapter 3, 'Progressive Feminist Legal
Scholarship: Can We Claim "A Different Voice?'''.
For a critique of this term and position within a feminist legal
context, see Cornell (1991), particularly ch 1, "The Maternal
a~d the Feminine: Social Reality, Fantasy and Ethical Relation".
Freud writes: 'There is only a violent jealous father who keeps
all the females to himself and drives away the growing sons.
This primal state of society has nowhere been observed. The
most primitive organisation we know, which today is still in
force among certain tribes, is associations ofmen consisting of
members with equal rights, subject to the restrictions of the
totem system, and founded on matriarch}', or descent through
the mother' (1985: 883).
A "legal fiction" is) according to The Oxford Companion to Law:
~ny assumption which conceals or affects to conceal the fact
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unchanged, its operation being modified'. See the entry for
'Fiction, legal'. Bentham, particularly, was a vociferous critic of
fictions. See Ogden (l932).
The term is, again, Bentham's, and used, highly pejoratively, to
describe the judicial monopoly of the law, and its ill effects:
piecemeal legislating, policy-less judging, linguistic legerdemain.
See: Wacks (1995: 39); Postema (1986: 267).
John Austin writes in The Uses o/the Study o/Jurisprudence that:
'As principles abstracted from positive systems are the subject of
general jurisprudence, so is the exposition ofsuch principles its
exclusive or appropriate object' (1954: 366).
Austin writes in The Province ofJurisprudence Determined that
Jaw is a species of command and that: 'A command is
distinguished ... by the power and the purpose of the party
commanding to inflict an evil or pain' (1954: 14).
Austin writes in The Province ofjurisprudence Determined: 'The
superiority which is styled sovereignty ... is distinguished from
other superiority, and from other society, by the following marks
or characters: 1. The bulk of the given society are in a habit of
obediance or submission to a determinate and common superior'
(1954: 193-194).
Austin writes 'Having suggested the purpose of my attempt to
determine the province ofjurisprudence: to distinguish positive
law, the appropriate matter of jurisprudence, from the various
objects to which it is related by resemblance, and to which it is
related, nearly or remotely, by a strong or slender analogy' (1954:
13).
Bentham writes, essentiaJly ofhis own project: 'To know what
is meant by jurisprudence, we must know, for example, what is
meant by a book ofjurisprudence. A book ofjurisprudence can








the law is: 2. to ascertain what it ought to be. In the former case
it may be styled a book ofexpository jurisprudence; in the l~tter)
a book of censorial jurisprudence; or, in other words, a book on
the art o/legislation' (1996: lla).
Indeed, Austin's principal modern advocate, Morison, calls his
outlook "reactionary') in ch 4, ''Austin: conservative or reformee'
{I 982). Jane Austen's conservatism, particularly with regard to
Pride andPrejudice, has been emphasised by Duckworth (1971:
116-28, 140-43) and Butler (1975: 197-98,203-7,210-13).
Gramsci writes, for example, 'The spontaneous consent given
by the great masses of the population to the general direction
imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this
consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent
confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its
position and function in the world ofproduction' (1988: 307).
For the extremely romantic, indeed "novelistic" story ofEliza,
Comtesse de Feuillade, see the detailed and informative account
of the Austen-Leigh family in Tucker (1983: 45-50).
For the former, classic 'suQversive' reading ofAusten, particularly
Pride and Prejudice, see Harding (1940: 346-47,351-54,362)
and Mudrick (1952: 107-13, 116-20, 123-25) The standard,
'reactionary' readings of Austen are Duckworth (1971) and
Butler (1975). For Austin, the same debate about politics -
conservative or liberal? - is staged internally in Morison's (1982)
text.
John Austin orJane Austen?
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